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Despite the merits of good farm record keeping, little is known about the value farmers place on 
their farm financial records.  This study uses a willingness-to-accept experimental second price 
auction to elicit such values from farmers.  Results indicate farm records are extremely valuable 
and that some diversity in values is explained by the characteristics of the records and farmers.  
We find that experimental auctions can be used to elicit values for extremely high-valued goods, 
and we demonstrate how they can be used to value a complex good comprised of many sub-
components.     
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Valuing Farm Financial Information 
For almost a century, agricultural economists have attempted to demonstrate to farmers the 
benefits of keeping financial records and have advocated sound accounting practices, e.g., Pond 
(1931) and Arnold (1931).  Since 1914, Land Grant Universities have encouraged better farm 
record keeping by forming farm management associations.  However, with the dwindling size of 
the farm population and the increases in technology and education of farmers, many have 
questioned the value of using public resources to support the maintenance of farm records.  
Indeed, today Cornell University, Kansas State University, and the University of Illinois are 
among the very few that still maintain farm management associations with very detailed modern 
record keeping activities.  Nevertheless, evidence exists that farmers’ record keeping may be 
sub-optimal.  For example, 57% of farm loan applicants in Kentucky did not keep separate 
records for their farm and household and only a meager 3% use a computerized accounting 
system (Ibendahl, Isaacs, and Trimble 2002).  Another study found that 29% of New York dairy 
farmers never formulate financial budgets (Gloy and LaDue 2003).  Evidence also exists that 
one-third of farmers dislike record keeping or paperwork activities and record keeping and 
attending meetings are the least favorite farm activities among farmers (Lasley and Agnitsch 
2002), possibly contributing to sub-optimal record keeping.   
Several studies have attempted to link record keeping with profitability and performance, 
but evidence is mixed and is plagued with problems of endogeneity.  Jackson-Smith, Trechter, 
and Splett (2004) found a relatively weak link between deeper understanding of financial 
concepts and greater financial return.  Gloy, LaDue, and Youngblood (2002) found that farmers 
who focused on profitability goals attained higher profitability, but they acknowledged this 
might be attributed to farmers selecting goals in areas where they are already proficient.  Ford  
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and Shonkwiler (1994) found that production practices were better than financial management 
indicators in predicting farm financial success. 
  Although the academic literature is replete with examples exposing the merits of farm 
record keeping and investigating the link between record keeping and financial performance, 
very little is known regarding the value farmers place on their financial information and the 
determinants of such value.  Clearly, such information is needed as public institutions determine 
the quantity and quality of resources to devote to encouraging and supporting maintenance of 
farm records.   
The primary purpose of this article is to determine the value farmers place on their 
financial information and the determinants of such value.  We use a willingness-to-accept 
experimental auction and survey to elicit values and information.  Experimental auctions have 
been used to estimate demand for and value numerous lower-valued goods or foods (e.g., Fox 
1995; Fox et al. 1998; List and Shogren 1998; Lusk et al. 2001a, 2001b; Lusk, Roosen, and Fox 
2003; Roosen et al. 1998; Shogren, List, and Hayes 2000).  This article uniquely uses such 
auctions to evoke values for extremely high-valued goods, in this case business records.   
This article tests the following hypotheses:  (a) farmers that spend more time preparing 
and analyzing records will value their records more highly; (b) farmers with higher gross sales 
and more acres (larger farms) will value their records more highly; (c) farmers with more 
education will value their records more highly; (d) younger farmers will value their records more 
highly; (e) farmers with more accurate records will value their records more highly; (f) farmers 
that use more accurate measures of farm performance will value their records more highly; (g) 
farmers that have financial training will value their records more highly; (h) farmers using 
technology to prepare financial records will value their records more highly; (i) farmers that use  
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records to evaluate farm performance and for investment decision-making will value their 
records more highly; (j) farmers that use their tax returns for decision-making purposes (do not 
simply store them) will value their records more highly. 
This research can provide insight by revealing the value farmers place on their business 
records.  If farmers place very high valuations on their financial information, then financial 
records, while not the favorite task of some farmers, are recognized as valuable and very 
necessary to a farming operation.  If farmer valuations for financial information are high, then 
past and future university farm financial management research and Extension work has been and 
will continue to be valuable to the farm business.  Due consideration should be given to 
resources for farm financial management work.  Additionally, this research provides insight on 
the use of experimental auction methods for valuing high-valued goods, which is currently 
absent from the existing literature. 
Conceptual Framework:  Irreplaceable Goods 
The manner that irreplaceable goods are valued, a topic found often in literature dealing with 
insurance (e.g., Cook and Graham 1977; Shioshansi 1982), has direct application to how farmers 
value their financial records.  An irreplaceable good is unique and cannot be exactly replaced if 
lost or stolen, unlike a replaceable good, which can be replaced if lost or stolen.  Commonly 
cited irreplaceable goods are family heirlooms.  An extreme irreplaceable good example is 
personal health (e.g., sight); there is no amount of money to fully compensate the owner over this 
lost object.  Specific to this research, a farmer’s financial records are considered an irreplaceable 
good.  Figure 1 represents the loss of an irreplaceable good.  Two states exist:  state a where the 
object is kept and state b where the object is lost.  At point A in Figure 1, the utility level U(W1, 
a) is the initial position where the owner is still in possession of the good.  When the object is  
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lost, the individual’s position moves to point B, on a lower utility level.  Since the object is 
irreplaceable, it is not possible to move back from point B to point A.  Due to the loss, the 
individual’s utility is reduced by the amount Ua(W1)-Ub(W1-Vm).  The loss can be broken down 
into two parts:  sentimental value (Vs) and actual monetary loss equal to the market value (Vm) of 
the good.  The sentimental loss in utility due to moving from state a to state b is shown by the 
move from Point A to B′.  The monetary loss is shown in moving from the initial wealth level 
W1 to W1-Vm or moving from point B′  to B.  The minimum amount of compensation the owner 
is willing to accept for the loss of the irreplaceable good is C(W), which is equal to Vs plus Vm. 
 
 
Figure 1.  The utility effects of an irreplaceable good 
 
Some irreplaceable objects have very little market value.  As in the case of this research, 
an individual farmer’s records have no market value.  The records are only of value to the owner, 
W1+Vs  W1-Vm 
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and there is no established market for the selling of farm financial records.
1  In such a case, the 
market value is negligible and the value of the object is established from the sentimental value.
2  
Figure 2 shows the change in utility for an irreplaceable good comprised solely of sentimental 
value.  The farmer in possession of his/her records is initially at point A.  The farmer will only 
forfeit his/her records to move to point C if he/she is compensated C(W) for the sentimental 
value. 
 
Figure 2.  The utility effects of an irreplaceable good with no market value 
 
Von Neumann-Morganstern Utility Function 
The graphical content of Figure 2 can also be expressed through equations following the 
insurance example by Cook and Graham (1972).  The individual preference of the farmer is 
expressed through the von Neumann-Morganstern utility function: 
                                                 
1 We assume that these farm financial records have no value for identity fraud. 
2 The term sentimental value is somewhat a misnomer in the case of financial records, and a term such as 
information value or personal value might be more appropriate.  Sentimental value is used in accordance with the 
terminology cited in other economic literature. 
W1+Vs  W1 
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U(W,θ), (1) 
where W represents wealth or a composite commodity involving all goods other than the 
commodity in question and is measured in dollars, and θ equals one if the farmer is in state a 
where his/her records are kept, and θ equals 0 in state b where his/her records are lost.  The 
farmer can be in one of the two following states where W≥0: 
Ua(W)=U(W,1)     or     Ub(W)=U(W,0). (2) 
It is assumed that the farmer prefers to be in state a where the records are in his/her possession, 
represented by the equation 
Ua(W)>Ub(W). (3) 
The first order equation of the utility function is positive and the second-order equation is 
negative meaning the farmer’s financial records are a normal good: 
Ui″ (W) < 0 < Ui′(W)  where i=a,b .  (4) 
  What value do irreplaceable financial records hold for the farmer?  The measure used in 
this article to determine the value of financial records is the minimum compensation, represented 
by the bid price submitted in an experimental 2
nd price auction, that would induce the 
participating farmer to accept state b in exchange for state a.  The compensation amount is C(W) 
and is defined by 
Ub(W+C(W))=Ua(W). (5) 
C(W) is assumed to exist or C(W) is infinite otherwise.  If C(W) is infinite, there is no amount of 
money the farmer is willing to be compensated by for the loss of his/her records.   
  The farmer’s value of his/her records could also be expressed as the maximum amount 
the individual farmer is willing to be assured for the exchange from state b to state a.  Ransom or  
  7 
R(W) is the amount an individual would exchange the certainty of state b for to receive the 
certainty of state a.  R(W) is defined as  
Ub(W)=Ua(W-R(W)). (6) 
Compensation and ransom should only theoretically differ by wealth effects.  For the purpose of 
this article, the amount of compensation needed to move farmers from state a (keeping their 
financial records) to state b (losing their financial records) is determined by an experimental 
auction.  The ransom amount could not be calculated through experimental auctions since the 
participating farmers were already in the state of possessing their records and not in the state of 
having lost their records.   
Experimental Auction Background 
We use experimental auctions to elicit an individual farmer’s value of his/her financial records.  
In the last decade, experimental auctions (EA) have become a popular method of non-market 
valuation.  EA have been recently used in agricultural economics literature to find consumer 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for items ranging from genetically modified food labels (Huffman et 
al. 2003) to tenderness and flavor in steaks (Feuz et al. 2004). The primary advantages of 
experimental auctions are the incentive compatible nature and nonhypothetical context of 
auctions as EA involve real goods and real money (Lusk 2003).  EA also have the benefit of 
obtaining a WTP (or bid) from each subject, and the modeling determinants of WTP are 
uncomplicated given the continuous nature of the dependent variable (Lusk and Hudson 2004). 
  Of the available experimental auction mechanisms, the Vickrey second-price auction has 
often been used.  The popularity of the second-price auction can be accredited to its 
characteristics:  it is demand revealing in theory, it is relatively easy to explain, and it has an 
endogenous market-clearing price (Huffman et al. 2003).  In a second-price auction, competitors  
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simultaneously submit sealed bids for a good.  The individual with the lowest bid wins the 
auction and pays the second highest bid price (Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004).  The 
second-price auction provides the incentive for study participants to truly reveal their preferences 
as the auction separates individual valuations from market price.  The market price (the 2
nd 
highest bid) is separate from one’s individual bid; consequently, there is no gain in strategic 
bidding.  Shogren et al. (1994) state, “bidding less than one’s true value reduces the chance of 
winning at would have been a profitable price, while bidding more than one’s true value 
increases the chance of winning but at a price that exceeds one’s value” (p. 1098).  However, 
some evidence suggests that subjects “over-bid” in second-price auctions compared to other 
auction-mechanisms (Kagel and Levin 1993; Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder 2004). 
Data and Methods 
Because this research is interested in valuing a good, e.g., farm records, which is owned by the 
study participants in question, a 2
nd price willingness-to-accept (WTA) auction was conducted.  
That is, we sought to measure the minimum amount of money that must be paid to a farmer such 
that they would be willing to permanently give up their financial records.  Several preliminary 
focus groups and pre-tests were conducted to determine an individual’s reaction to the auction 
mechanism and to determine how to characterize records which could vary greatly in terms of 
quantity and quality.  It was learned that a non-trivial number of individuals were unwilling to 
bid to give up their records.  This led us to modify the auction format such that individuals could 
simply check a box on their bid-sheet indicating they did not want to participate in the auction.   
  Participants in the primary portion of the study came from two main sources.  First, 35 
people were recruited from a “Top Farmer Crop Workshop” held at Purdue University; the 
audience was a group of competitive, commercial producers.  Participation in the experiment  
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was part of an optional luncheon session.  Second, 37 people were recruited by Purdue 
University Extension educators to attend one of five sessions in various regions of Indiana.  An 
average of seven farmers came to each session, which took place at a local restaurant or at the 
county building.  To encourage farmer participation, the farmers were given a free lunch for their 
participation. 
  Data collection proceeded in three stages.  Participants first completed a written survey, 
then participated in a willingness-to-accept auction to give up an endowed candy bar, and finally, 
bids in the non-hypothetical financial records auction were collected.  The survey collected 
information on the individuals, their farms, and their farm records.  Once respondents completed 
the survey, they read instructions for the second price candy bar auction.  The candy bar auction 
was used to introduce the mechanism to participants so as to increase understanding.  Each 
participant was endowed with a name brand candy bar and subjects bid, in a second price 
auction, to sell their candy bar back to the monitor.  The lowest bidder won the auction and was 
paid the second lowest bid amount for their candy bar. 
  After the candy bar auction, participants were informed of the chance to sell their 
financial records in a second price auction similar to the one they had previously participated in.  
The farmers then completed an inventory sheet identifying the type and quality of records they 
possessed.  For example, subjects were asked whether they maintained a balance sheet, statement 
of cash flows, income statement, statement of owner’s equity, checkbook register, and tax 
records.  For each item listed, farmers were asked if they prepared the item listed, how many of 
the past five years have they prepared the item, and if the item’s form was handwritten or 
electronic.   
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  After the participants filled out the financial records inventory sheet, they were requested 
to decide on an amount, e.g., a bid, for which they were willing to sell all the documents listed on 
their inventory.  Because the bid consists of the price at which participants were willing to sell 
several different types of financial information, the participants were asked to indicate, in 
percentage terms, the amount that reflected their value for the balance sheet, statement of cash 
flows, income statement, statement of owner’s equity, checkbook register, and tax records.   
Several key points were emphasized to the participants.  Participants were informed that 
bids would be collected at several locations over the time period of several days.  The lowest 
bidder across all locations would be contacted later to be informed of their winning.  It was also 
stressed that the auction was not hypothetical; the winner would receive real money for his/her 
financial records.  The instructions emphasized that the winner was expected to give all originals 
and copies of the records listed on their individual financial records inventory sheet.  It was made 
clear that the farmer with the lowest bid would receive in cash the overall second lowest bid 
price, but he/she would forfeit his records.  A tax audit was the only exception to the winner of 
the auction regaining the right to view his/her records.  As in the candy bar auction, it was 
explained, in detail, why the best strategy was to submit a bid exactly equal to the amount that 
would make the person indifferent between money and their records.  It was explained that no 
bid was too small or too high.  The participants were also told that if there was no amount of 
money they were willing to accept for their financial records, they could select that option on the 
bid sheet.  An opt-out option was offered to discourage participants from writing down an 
artificially high bid price out of “protest” and to discourage participants from leaving the bid 
sheet blank.
3   
                                                 
3 Auction instructions, the bid sheet, and the survey are available from the authors on request.  
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Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics of selected demographic variables.  The data 
are broken down into our two general participant groups:  the county Extension meetings and the 
Top Farmer Crop Workshop (TFCW) participants.  The data are broken down since the TFCW 
participants are inclined to be more competitive, commercial farmers than average.  Data 
indicate the TFCW participants had on average 1,500 more acres in crop production and were 
more likely to have achieved a higher level of education than county meeting farmers.  
Additionally, the vast majority of the study’s participants were male; 100% of the TFCW 
participants and 91% of the county meeting participants were male.  Finally, the average ages of 
the TFCW participants and county meeting participants were 45 and 50 years, respectively. 
 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Participant Farm Acres by Commodity 
    Corn Soybeans Wheat Fruits/Veg. Forage  Other  Total 
County Meetings 
Mean 684  533  18  0 22  1  1,257 
Median 500  350 0  0  0  0  950 
Minimum 0  0  0  0  0 0 0 
Maximum 3,200  2,300 200  2  300  25  4,800 
Stand Dev.  743  561  43  0  58  4  1,221 
Number of 
Participants 30  29  10  1  11  1  33 
 
TFCW 
Mean 1,381  1,082 226  2  36 27  2,754 
Median 1,100  925 0  0  0  0  2,293 
Minimum 0  0  0  0  0 0  80 
Maximum 3,500  3,000 1,300  60  400 837  7,500 
Stand Dev.  1,041  879 425  10  89  144  2,023 
Number of 
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Responses 2  11  7  6  2  8 
Percentages  6% 31% 20% 17%  6%  23% 
 
TFCW 
Responses 0  1  8  14  5  6 




Of the 72 participants in the study, 53 submitted positive bids, 18 people checked the box on the 
bid sheet indicating that there was no amount of money they would accept for their records, and 
1 person did not complete their bid sheet.  Two of the 72 participants did not fully complete their 
surveys and the bid sheet so their results were not included in the analysis.  One completed bid 
was eliminated from the analysis as the bid was four times the next highest bid and was greater 
than the operation’s total fair market value for the size of operation indicated on the survey.  A 
total of 69 bids (including the participants that checked the no-bid box) were included in the 
results.  Of those individuals submitting bids, the range was from $100 to $2,500,000, with the 
average bid being $145,657 and the median being $25,575. 
  Table 3 reports the distribution of bid prices.  Nearly 50% of the bids were in the bid 
range $10,001 to $100,000; roughly 33% were below $10,000 and 17% were greater than 
$100,000.  For the 18 participants that marked the no-bid box, it is possible there was truly no 
amount of money that they were willing to receive for their records, that they did not understand 
the auction mechanism, that their true valuations were so high they no had chance of winning the  
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auction and replied as such so that they did not have to submit bid prices, or that they simply did 
not want to participate. 
 
Table 3.  Bid Value Distribution    





$0 - $1,000  5    9.80%     9.80% 
$1,001 - $10,000  12  23.53%    33.33% 
$10,001 - $20,000  5   9.80%    43.14% 
$20,001 - $40,000  5   9.80%    52.94% 
$40,001 - $60,000  9  17.65%    70.59% 
$60,001 - $80,000  1    1.96%    72.55% 
$80,001 - $100,000  5    9.80%    82.35% 
$100,001 - $500,000  5    9.80%    92.16% 
$500,001 - $1,000,000  2    3.92%    96.08% 
greater than $1,000,000  2    3.92%  100.00% 
 
Values by Record Type 
A participant’s bid consists of their value for six potential types of records (balance sheet, 
statement of cash flows, income statement, statement of owner’s equity, checkbook register, and 
tax records).  After submitting their bid, participants were asked to indicate, of the total bid 
amount, the percentage value attributable to each type of record.  Specific values for an 
individual record type can be determined by multiplying the assigned percentage by the 
submitted bid price. 
  Table 4 reports summary statistics for the specific values for the auctioned records.
4  
Table 4 indicates tax records were on average the most valued type of record, followed by the 
balance sheet.  The checkbook register, cash flow statement, and statement of owner’s equity 
were on average the least valued types of records. 
                                                 
4 Results include participants that assigned certain records a value of $0 and presume that participants that did not 
prepare certain records also valued that specific record at $0.  
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Mean $30,747  $17,477  $26,180  $19,016  $13,420  $39,755 
Median   $7,500  $1,575  $4,500  $1,000  $1,875  $5,000 
Minimum $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $38 
Maximum $500,000  $500,000 $500,000 $500,000  $300,000 $700,000 
Standard 
Deviation 488,906  $70,418  $82,179  $474,847  $43,273  $120,295 
Mean 
Percent 20.35%  10.44%  15.55% 7.40%  18.39%  30.10% 
            
NSB
a Mean 
Percent 27.86%  10.00%  14.62% 8.33%  17.86%  32.14% 
a Participants that marked the no submitted bid box.  
 
The assigned percentage weights of the individual records also provide insight on what 
records farmers value most.  Fifteen of the 18 participants that did not submit a bid price did 
provide percentage weights for their financial records (table 4).  The percentage weights assigned 
by the no-bidders are in most cases similar to those provided by the participants that submitted a 
bid price.  For both groups of participants, tax records were the most valued records percentage-
wise, followed by the balance sheet, checkbook register, income statement, statement of cash 
flows, and the statement of owner’s equity, respectively. 
Farmer Characteristics and Bid Values 
Because of the wide dispersion of auction bids, farmers were placed in one of four roughly even 
sized bid categories: bids between $0 and $14,999, bids between $15,000 and $75,499, bids 
$75,000 and greater, and farmers who did not submit a bid.  Categorizing the bids into ranges 
and including a ‘no submitted bid’ category as a bid range allows participants that did not submit 
a bid to be compared to those that did submit a bid when examining factors that influence bid 
price.  
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  The PROC GLM (General Linear Model) in SAS was used to run ANOVA tests.  Each 
bid range was assigned a factor level: greater than $75,000=1, $15,000-$75,499=2, $14,999-0=3, 
no bid=4.  A class statement was used in PROC GLM to define the bid range variable as a 
classification or categorical variable.  The null hypothesis tested is that the mean value for a 
variable (e.g., time spent preparing records) is the same for all bid ranges.   
Table 5 shows the means for several record, farm, and farmer characteristics segregated 
by the four bid categories.  Results indicate that those individuals submitting the lowest bids 
spend the least amount of time, on average, preparing their records.  The hypothesis that the 
mean time spent preparing records is the same for each of the four bid categories can be rejected 
at the p=0.01 level according to an ANOVA test.  Time spent analyzing records was roughly 
increasing in the amount bid for financial records, but the means were not statistically different 
across categories.  Table 5 shows a pronounced difference in the value of farm records across 
farm size.  Farmers in the lowest bid category ($0 to $14,999) had gross farm sales 4.26 times 
lower ($1,015,000 vs. $238,160), on average, than farmers in the highest bid category ($75,000 
and greater).  The hypotheses that mean gross farm sales and mean farm acreage are the same 
across bid categories can be rejected at the p=0.01 level according to the ANOVA tests.  
However, although older farmers tended to submit either lower or no-bids, and those submitting 
bids in the highest bid category ($75,000 and greater) were the most educated on average, results 
of the ANOVA tests could not reject the hypotheses that age and education were equivalent 
across bid categories.  The results in table 5 also provide some insight into the characteristics of 
the individuals choosing not to bid in the auction.  Such individuals tended to be the least 
educated, the oldest, and while having relatively large farms in terms of acreage, their gross sales  
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were relatively low (i.e., they were low performing as exhibited by relatively small gross sales 
per acre). 
 





















































$0-14,999  19 8.95 6.32  238.16  689  4.16  50.95 
$15,000-$75,499  17 21.47 9.12  1,050.00  2,571  3.76  43.47 
$75,000 and greater  15 19.00  10  1,015.00  2,533  4.27  43.87 
No submitted bid  18 13.33 8.61  633.33  2,311  3.50  52.11 
             
P-value
d    0.01 0.56 0.01  0.01  0.41  0.10 
aParticipants indicated time used by marking a time range; estimations were made to allow for ANOVA analysis.  0 
hours/month=0 hours; likewise 0-10 hours =5; 10-20 hours =15; 20-30 hours =25; 30-40 hours =35; 30-40 hours 
=35; and over 40 hours =45.   
bAnnual gross farms sales ranges from the survey were changed to:  less than $100,000=$50,000; $100,000-
$250,000=$175,000; $250,000-$500,000=$375,000; $500,000-$1,000,000=$750,000; and over 
$1,000,000=$1,500,000. 
c1=high school credit, 2=high school graduate, 3=college credit, 4=college graduate, 5=graduate credit, 6=graduate 
degree. 
dP-value from an ANOVA test of the hypothesis that the mean value of the variable in the column is the same for all 




 Because ANOVA can only be used with continuous dependent variables, the binary 
results from the survey were analyzed through bid range categorization and mean response.  
Several farm record keeping activities are of interest.  Specific interest areas include: (a) how 
accurate are the financial records; (b) what measures of farm performance are used; (c) what type 
of financial training has been received; (d) how is technology used; and (e) how are records used.   
Table 6 reports the mean responses of survey questions pertaining to record accuracy, key 
financial performance measures, and financial training.  The type of accounting system used (i.e., 
cash or accrual) and the method of valuing assets (i.e., cost basis or market value) were  
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indicators of financial accuracy.  The practices of keeping personal and farm records separate, 
reconciling bank statements with farm records, and generating balance sheets at the beginning 
and end of each accounting period were also viewed as activities that increased accuracy.  
Participants that used accrual accounting, kept farm records separate from personal records, 
reconciled bank statements with farm records, and generated balance sheets at the beginning and 
end of each accounting period tended to submit higher bids.  The responses for using a cash-
based system or an accrual system and using cost basis or a market value to value assets are 
mixed as many participants seemed to use some type of combination of accounting systems and 
asset valuation methods.  Table 6 suggests that participants electing not to bid lagged behind in 
some areas of accuracy but not in others. 
Results in table 6 support the expectations that farmers with some financial training and 
farmers using more accurate measures of farm performance will more highly value their records.  
A larger percentage of farmers with higher bids had financial training than farmers with lower 
bids.  Farm performance was assessed through farmer use of the profitability measures of net 
cash income, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), checkbook balance, gross (total) 
cash income, and accrual net farm income.  Fifty percent of participants with bids greater than 
$75,000 used ROE as a principal financial performance measure—a preferred method due to its 
accuracy in measuring performance.  Twenty-nine percent of the participants in the highest bid 
range were also using the other preferred performance measure of ROA.  The majority of 
participants in the lowest bid category and the no-bidders preferred net cash income as their key 
measure of farm performance. 
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Table 6.  Mean
a Response for Farm Records Characteristics in Four Bid Ranges 
 Bid  Range 
Survey Question  $0-14,999  $15,000-75,499  $75,000 and greater  No submitted bid 
Accuracy        
Cash Accounting  0.89  0.94  0.87  0.89 
Accrual Accounting  0.30  0.20  0.57  0.00 
Cost Basis  0.32  0.13  0.13  0.28 
Market Value  0.42  0.31  0.40  0.50 
Farm & Personal 
Records Separate  0.79 0.82  0.93  0.78 
Reconcile Records & 
Bank Statement  0.74  0.94  0.93  0.56 
Beginning & Ending 
Balance Sheets  0.47  0.76  0.87  0.83 
        
Key Financial Measures        
Net Cash Income  0.58  0.41  0.29  0.72 
ROA 0.21  0.18  0.29  0.17 
ROE 0.11  0.29  0.50  0.22 
Checkbook Balance  0.16  0.06  0.14  0.00 
Gross Cash Income  0.16  0.06  0.07  0.06 
Accrual Net Farm 
Income 0.11  0.29  0.29  0.22 
        
Financial Training        
Training Received  0.47  0.59  0.67  0.56 
        
a 1 = positive response (i.e., yes); 0 = negative response (i.e., no). 
 
Table 7 reports mean responses of survey questions for computer use and specific 
purposes of farm financial records.  More than 90% of the participants with higher bids use a 
computer for farm record keeping, while only 68% of participants with bids under $15,000 do so.  
Participants with bids over $15,000 had higher rates of computer ownership and computer usage 
for farm tasks.  The no-bid participants had lower percentage computer ownership but seemed to 
better utilize the computer for farm tasks than participants with bids under $15,000.    
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Participants were also asked if they use their farm records for tax purposes, enterprise 
analysis, securing loans, evaluating farm performance, aiding in investment decisions, budget 
preparation, and aiding in capital purchases.  They were further asked if they use tax returns just 
for storage, to measure farm performance, to manage taxable income, and to decide how much 
income to transfer into family living expenses.  Participants submitting bids of $75,000 and 
greater tended to use records to evaluate farm performance and to aid in investment decisions 
more than lower bidders (table 7).  Additionally, 90% or more of participants with bids of 
$75,000 and greater used their financial records for all specified purposes except enterprise 
analysis and investment decisions.  The no-bid participants all used records for tax purposes, but 
as a whole were under utilizing records in comparison other participants.  Table 7 also shows 
that higher bidding participants tended to use their tax returns for more purposes other than 
storage.  Sixty-one percent of the participants who did not submit a bid price used their tax 
records to measure farm performance.  This result is not surprising since many of this group do 
not use some of the more sophisticated methods of measuring farm performance (table 6) and 
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Table 7.  Mean
a Response for Computer and Farm Records Uses in Four Bid Ranges 
 Bid  Range 
Survey Question  $0-14,999  $15,000-75,499  $75,000 and greater  No submitted bid 
Computer Use        
Own a Computer  0.95  1.00  1.00  0.89 
Personal Use  0.89  0.94  0.87  0.78 
Farm Communications  0.63  0.94  0.80  0.78 
Gather Farm 
Information 0.58  0.76  0.73  0.67 
Purchase Farm Inputs  0.11  0.41  0.60  0.28 
Keep Farm Records  0.68  0.94  0.93  0.78 
        
Uses of Records        
Tax Purposes  1.00  1.00  0.93  1.00 
Enterprise Analysis  0.65  0.65  0.80  0.61 
Secure Loans   0.94  0.94  1.00  0.61 
Evaluate Farm 
Performance 0.82  0.82 1.00 0.78 
Investment Decisions  0.76  0.76  0.80  0.61 
Budget Preparation  0.76  0.76  0.93  0.61 
Capital Purchases  0.94  0.94  0.93  0.83 
        
Tax Record Use        
Store Only  0.68  0.65  0.67  0.61 
Measure Farm 
Performance 0.11  0.41 0.27 0.61 
Manage Taxable 
Income 0.42  0.88  0.80  0.78 
Decide Income Transfer  
Family Living Expenses  0.11  0.12  0.27  0.28 
        
a 1 = positive response (i.e., yes); 0 = negative response (i.e., no). 
 
Conclusions 
Since the 1930s, farmers have been exhorted to practice good financial record keeping due to the 
valuable information records can provide a farming operation.  However, very little has been 
known regarding the value farmers place on their financial information and the determinants of  
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such value.  This study used a willingness-to-accept experimental auction and survey 
questionnaire to elicit values from farmers for their farm financial records and to collect general 
record use and demographic information. 
  One message from this study is that, for the sample of farmers considered, farm records 
were extremely valuable.  On average, individuals bid $145,657 to give up their farm financial 
records.  Results also suggest wide diversity in valuations with bids ranging from $100 to 
$2,500,000, with close to 50% of bids in the range of $100,000 to $500,000.  Some of this 
diversity is explained by characteristics of the records and farmers: larger farmers tended to 
value their records more as did farmers who spent more time preparing their records.  A larger 
percentage of farmers with financial training tended to value their records more as did farmers 
who used more accurate measures of performance and record keeping practices.   
While the bids were wide in range, the majority were not for relative small amounts of 
money.  The overall high nature of the bids submitted suggests that financial records are indeed 
very valuable to most farmers.  While farm record keeping might not be a most preferable 
activity for a farmer, financial records are a vital part of the farm operation.  The result that 25% 
of the participants refused to even submit a price for the sale of their records further suggests a 
high value to farmers.  It appears most farmers have either heeded the words of agriculture 
educators or discovered for themselves the importance of financial information. 
  Financial record keeping is not a new concept that applies directly to field production 
practices or sophisticated technology which might keep it from being at the forefront of farmer 
conversations, agribusiness periodicals, Extension meetings, or even university research.  While 
financial record keeping might not be agriculture’s latest focus, it still has an important role in 
production agriculture as indicated by this study’s results.  Clearly, these findings provide  
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important information for public institutions debating the allocation of resources to encouraging 
and supporting maintenance of farm records and to new research and training on ways to better 
record and analyze financial records. 
  Another important message from this study is that experimental auctions can be used to 
elicit the values for extremely high-valued goods.  This study also demonstrates some challenges 
in implementing experimental auctions for high-valued goods.  For this study, the theoretical 
construct of interest was willingness-to-accept.  We were interested in the value individuals 
placed on the records they owned.  The study indicated that a quarter of the individuals were not 
willing to state a bid to sell their records.  Such a finding is difficult to reconcile in that there is 
likely some amount of money that would indeed make an individual indifferent to having their 
records and not having them.  What the result likely implies is that some individuals either do not 
understand the mechanism or are “protesting” the auction as conducted.  That low-performing, 
older, and less-educated farmers were less likely to submit a bid is consistent with this 
hypothesis.     
  This study illustrates experimental auction methods need not be limited to low-valued 
goods or food.  Despite the relatively high frequency of no-bidders, bidding behavior conformed 
to a priori expectations, i.e., farms with higher gross sales valued their records more highly, 
suggesting a reasonable degree of validity.  This study also demonstrated how experimental 
auctions can be used to value a relatively complex good comprised of many sub-components and 
offered one method for separately valuing each sub-component.  
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